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1. Introduction 
Alex Sarch’s recent book, Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What 
We Don’t is a wonderfully rich work.1 Sarch provides and defends an explanatorily 
powerful theory of criminal culpability that concerns insufficient regard for interests, 
values, and reasons (manifested by a criminal action) that are recognised and 
protected by the criminal law.2 This theory, combined with his formulation and 
defence of a restricted version of the Equal Culpability Thesis—according to which, 
ceteris paribus, a wilfully ignorant actor who is culpable (to a sufficient degree) for a 
breach of the duty to reasonably inform herself is as culpable as a knowing actor—
provides a compelling theory of the substantive wilful ignorance doctrine that exists 
in the US federal criminal law.3 
 One of the explanatory virtues of Sarch’s account of (posited) criminal 
culpability is that it not only explains various features and doctrines of the US federal 
criminal law (even though this jurisdiction is his focus), but, given the similarities 
between doctrines in the various criminal legal systems in the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, it can explain features of Anglo-American criminal law more generally. 
For instance, Sarch can accommodate the fact that, typically, motives are not relevant 
to findings of (criminal) guilt by appealing to the fact that, in general, ‘one’s subjective 
motives or aims do not impact the amount of insufficient regard’ that is manifested 
when preforming criminal acts.4 
 Another virtue of Sarch’s picture is that it can provide a promising defence of 
many existing doctrines of (Anglo-American) criminal law, such as the Culpability 
Hierarchy which claims that ‘[a]ll else equal, it is more culpable to do a prohibited 
 
1  Alexander Sarch, Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t (Oxford 
University Press 2019). 
2 ibid 44–46. 
3 The precise definition of the Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis that Sarch defends is as follows: 
Suppose A1 and A2 each perform the actus reus of a crime requiring knowledge of an 
inculpatory proposition, p. A1 and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every 
respect except one: while A1’s action is performed with knowledge of p, A2’s action is 
performed with a form of willful ignorance toward p that involves a sufficiently culpable breach of the 
duty to reasonably inform oneself. On these suppositions, A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action 
as A1 is for his. (ibid 110.) 
4  ibid 56. Sarch also shows how his picture can explain ‘the tangle of doctrines pertaining to 
unmanifested mental states’ (64). See especially Chapter 2, Section III.C “How Much Insufficient 
Regard Is Manifested” (50-58). 
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act with a mens rea that is higher up in the hierarchy than an act that is identical in 
every relevant respect except that it was done with a lower mens rea’.5  
 Importantly for Sarch, these two virtues—explanatory power and a promising 
defence—are unified. This is because Sarch’s explanatory story is supplied by his 
account of posited criminal culpability which concerns insufficient regard that is 
manifested by a criminal action for ‘interests, values, or reasons that the criminal law 
recognizes in a given jurisdiction’ while his justificatory story is supplied by normative 
(criminal) culpability which concerns insufficient regard that is manifested by an action 
for interests, values, and reasons that the criminal law should recognise and protect.6 
This similarity between these two notions of posited and normative culpability is 
what helps to unify the explanatory or descriptive theory and the justificatory or 
normative theory of the (substantive) wilful ignorance doctrine.  
 Sarch further claims that another virtue of his picture is that ‘it neatly preserves 
continuity between moral blameworthiness and criminal culpability, while also 
respecting the differences between them’.7 This is important for Sarch because the 
continuity or ‘structural analogy’ between normative criminal culpability and moral 
blameworthiness provides ‘a more solid normative foundation for the criminal law’s 
practice of imputing mental states on equal culpability grounds’.8  Hence, Sarch 
appeals to the continuity between these notions—posited culpability, normative 
culpability, and moral blameworthiness—to do important justificatory work for him. 
Although he does not explicitly state why this continuity is regarded as a good thing, 
I take it that he is emboldened by the following thought: if there is a tight connection 
between moral blameworthiness and normative culpability, and a tight connection 
between normative culpability and posited culpability, then the arguments for the 
(substantive) wilful ignorance doctrine can come, not only from a defence of the legal 
notion of culpability, but they can be supported by a morally and metaphysically 
robust notion of moral blameworthiness (via an intermediary notion of normative 
culpability).  
 Later in this paper, I shall raise some challenges to those who, like Sarch, are 
animated by this thought. However, it would be amiss to fail to mention another 
important virtue of Sarch’s book: explicit statements of his methodology on how to 
best theorise about the criminal law (although this is not touted as a virtue by Sarch 
himself). He claims, for instance, that it is ‘[b]etter to start by seeing how far we can 
get by defending in the law’s core features, given their development through centuries 
of practical experience’.9 This methodological statement plays an important role in 
Sarch’s overall argument because this methodology involves starting with an analysis 
of the (criminal) law’s core features and presuming that these core features are 
justifiable. This methodological presumption seems innocuous. After all, one natural 
way of proceeding is to describe and make sense of the existing law first and then 
critically evaluate it. Indeed, the claim that we should start with a ‘rational 
 
5 ibid 60. 
6 ibid 45–46. 
7 ibid 64. 
8 ibid 265. 
9 ibid 10. 
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reconstruction’ of the criminal law is a widespread methodological presumption.10 
However, I attempt to put pressure on this presumption by unpacking it and seeing 
what is involved in this presumption and to show that this presumption has 
substantive implications.  
 In addition, he explicitly states that his focus is on particular justificatory 
arguments for the substantive wilful ignorance doctrine. In his view, ‘the court’s 
preferred rationale should be taken seriously and adhered to at least as our starting 
point’.11 This suggests that Sarch’s methodology not only involves presuming that the 
court has ‘got things right’ substantively (that is, the core substantive doctrines are 
correct or, at least, justifiable), but it also involves presuming that the court’s 
preferred rationales for these core substantive doctrines are correct. If these 
methodological presumptions are justified, then Sarch’s choice to focus on the 
substantive wilful ignorance doctrine (arguably a core feature of the US federal 
criminal law) and his choice to omit discussions of arguments for the wilful ignorance 
doctrine which are not court’s preferred rational would also be justified.12  
 The fact that Sarch is explicit about his methodology is commendable. But this 
clarity also provides an opportunity to reflect critically on methodology. I take up this 
opportunity in this paper. I hope that my reflections on Sarch’s methodological 
presumptions have a more general lesson as these presumptions are ubiquitous. 
2. Methodological Presumption 1: Core Features 
Let us first turn to the presumption according to which the core features of the 
criminal law are correct or justifiable. For this methodological presumption to be 
relevant to the examination of wilful ignorance, the wilful ignorance doctrine itself 
must be a core feature of the criminal law. Moreover, since one of the explanatory 
virtues of Sarch’s picture is its generalisability to various Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, the wilful ignorance doctrine itself must be a core feature of the 
criminal law in these different legal systems. However, while wilful ignorance is a 
recognised legal notion in many criminal jurisdictions, the particular version of the 
wilful ignorance doctrine as articulated by the US federal courts is not shared by 
other jurisdictions. Sarch argues that wilful ignorance is a substantive doctrine in the 
US federal criminal law according to which a defendant who is wilfully ignorant of 
some inculpatory proposition is as culpable as potential counterpart who knows that 
proposition even though the defendant does not, in fact, know that proposition. This 
can be contrasted with treating wilful ignorance as an evidentiary doctrine according 
to which the finding that a defendant was wilfully ignorant of an inculpatory 
 
10 See, for instance, Antony Duff’s description of a normative theory of criminal law and the role of 
rational reconstructions of existing criminal law in providing such a theory in his Answering for Crime: 
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2007) 6–7. For some critical comments 
on Duff’s methodology, see contributions to a symposium on Duff’s latest book, The Realm of the 
Criminal Law The Realm of Criminal Law (OUP Oxford 2018). In particular, see Nicola Lacey 
‘Approaching or Re-Thinking the Realm of Criminal Law?’ [2019] Criminal Law and Philosophy. and 
Patrick Tomlin ‘Duffing Up the Criminal Law?’ [2019] Criminal Law and Philosophy. 
11 Sarch (n 1) 16. 
12 One might think that the second presumption that I attribute to Sarch is too strong. After all, Sarch 
might merely be committed to the claim that the court’s preferred rationale is justifiable. I turn to this 
point in §3. 
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proposition is evidence for the defendant’s actual knowledge of that proposition.13 As 
Mark Dsouza argues in his contribution to this book symposium, wilful ignorance is 
plausibly an evidentiary doctrine (rather than a substantive one) in England and Wales.  
 I should clarify that I am not rejecting Sarch’s descriptive analysis of the 
substantive wilful ignorance doctrine as implemented by the US federal courts. But 
I give this as an example that illustrates a certain shortfall of the presumption of 
correctness or justifiability of the core features of the criminal law in one 
jurisdiction.14 Perhaps this shortfall is not particularly significant. After all, when one 
aims to defend a particular doctrine that exists in a particular jurisdiction, the 
presumption that this doctrine is correct or justifiable may not have any substantial 
implications. But note that this methodological presumption means that some 
sources of argument or avenues of exploration are omitted in an otherwise rich and 
comprehensive treatment of wilful ignorance. To make this more concrete, imagine 
a legal philosopher who holds the same methodological commitments as Sarch but 
is one who is embedded in the English criminal legal context. Suppose also that in 
England, the best description of the wilful ignorance doctrine, as articulated by the 
relevant courts, is an evidentiary one. Given the significant differences between the 
evidentiary and substantive versions of the wilful ignorance doctrine, this work might 
culminate in a picture that is substantially different from Sarch’s picture. I find this 
possibility unsettling. Of course, it is possible that this hypothetical work is less 
compelling than Sarch’s picture. Perhaps the examination of the arguments for the 
evidentiary wilful ignorance doctrine would result in arguments for the substantive 
version of the doctrine. Nonetheless, the fairly reasonable possibility that the same 
methodological presumptions would lead to a significantly different treatment of 
wilful ignorance doctrine makes me question the justifiability of the first of Sarch’s 
methodological presumption that it’s better to start with the core features of the law 
in one jurisdiction. 
 This methodological presumption also has another substantive implication. For 
instance, Sarch considers but rejects a broader notion of wilful ignorance which 
includes a species of negligence because ‘this broad notion is not the concept of willful 
ignorance that the criminal law employs.’15 This is an example of omission that is 
justified only if Sarch’s first methodological presumption is justified. I discuss the 
implication of this below at the end of §2.1. 
 One might respond by noting that this methodological presumption is fairly 
weak. We have to start somewhere, and this may be as good a way as any to decide 
the boundaries of a topic given various constraints on our time and resources (let 
alone word limits). Hence, limiting one book-length treatment of a topic to one 
jurisdiction may be justifiable and the best way of proceeding. However, we should 
note that this innocuous-seeming presumption involves at least two claims. The first 
claim is that (A) the criminal law has something called ‘core features’ and the second 
claim is that (B) the core features of the criminal law are justified or at the very least, 
justifiable. Moreover, as we shall see, there is an unstated assumption behind this 
 
13 Sarch (n 1) 12–13. 
14 Here, I am treating the U.S. federal criminal law as one jurisdiction. 
15 Sarch (n 1) 20 my emphasis. 
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first methodological presumption, namely that (C) the core features of the criminal 
law are to be justified in terms of a single theory of culpability. 
2.1. (A) Core Features 
Claim (A) that the criminal law has some core features is widely held. However, we 
should note that in order to rely on this claim (and hence accept the first 
methodological presumption), one needs to make claims about what counts as core 
features of the criminal law. But, of course, what counts as a core feature of a 
particular system depends on various assumptions. To illustrate, consider the claim 
that ‘[m]otives generally don’t matter’ which is treated by Sarch as a core feature of 
the criminal law.16 This core feature of the criminal law is justified by the fact that 
‘one is not criminally culpable for acting lawfully even for bad reasons’ (43) and by 
the fact ‘substantive criminal law doctrine usually is not concerned with one’s reasons 
for violating the law’.17 
 I agree that these two facts support the claim that motives generally don’t matter 
to substantive criminal law where ‘substantive criminal law’ is concerned with the 
guilt-determining phase of criminal proceedings.18 But it is less clear that these two 
facts support the even more general claim that motives generally don’t matter to 
criminal law simpliciter. This is because, as Sarch acknowledges, motives affect 
sentencing. The underlying assumption appears to be that although motives are 
relevant to sentencing and to a few offences, this is not sufficient to override the 
general irrelevance of motives to criminal law. However, given the substantial 
implications of sentencing to offenders and given that sentencing is one significant 
aspect of the criminal law, in absence of further argument, the claim that motives 
generally don’t matter to criminal law seems insufficiently supported. Moreover, 
when one reasonably claims that sentencing ought to be proportional to the crime 
committed, one is plausibly claiming (among other things) that the degree of 
culpability manifested in the crime should be considered when identifying 
sentencing that is proportionate.  
 This is not to deny that (i) substantive criminal law can be distinguished from 
other aspects of the criminal law (such as sentencing or plea bargaining); or (ii) that 
motives generally do not matter to substantive criminal law. But the claim that motives 
are generally irrelevant to the criminal law simpliciter and that this is a core feature of 
the criminal law (simpliciter) requires justifying some controversial claims about the 
criminal law (simpliciter), namely that the guilt-determining stage of criminal 
proceedings is much more significant to criminal law than the sentencing stage. (As 
we shall see, this is particularly pressing because of claim (C) that the core features of 
the criminal law are to be justified in terms of a single theory of culpability.) 
 
16 ibid 43. This is his datapoint (vi) which outlines the complex role of motives in the criminal law. 
17 ibid 43–44. Sarch is careful to acknowledge that ‘there are exceptions to substantive criminal law’s 
general indifference to motives’ and gives examples of treason, kidnapping, and hate crimes as offences 
that include bad motives as an element (ibid 30). 
18 This does not entail that these two facts provide sufficient grounds for thinking that motives don’t 
generally matter to substantive criminal law. For instance, motives may be relevant to determining the 
validity of a justificatory defence. (See Mark Dsouza’s contribution to this symposium.) If so, then 
motives are relevant to determining guilt. The question then is whether we have sufficient datapoints 
from (substantive) criminal law to vindicate the claim that motives are generally irrelevant to 
determining guilt. 
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 In addition, Sarch rejects a broader notion of wilful ignorance that includes a 
species of negligence on the grounds that this broad notion is not the concept that is 
employed in US federal criminal law. But the examination of Sarch’s first 
methodological presumption shows that for this rejection to be justified, there must 
not only be a compelling case for the claim that this broad notion is not a concept 
employed by the criminal law (in the particular jurisdiction), but that there is also a 
compelling that this is a core feature of the criminal law (in that jurisdiction). Hence, 
even the fairly modest claim that the criminal law has core features has significant 
implications and claims about what features count as the core features are in need of 
more robust justification.  
2.2. Core Features and Culpability 
Recall that Sarch’s first methodological presumption is not merely that we ought to 
start with the best description of the core features of the criminal law in a particular 
jurisdiction. The presumption also entails that once we have identified and analysed 
the core features of the criminal law (in one jurisdiction), we should assume that 
these features are justified and try to defend them. But, importantly, Sarch assumes 
that we should look for a single coherent theory of culpability to explain and justify 
these core features. If we reject this unstated assumption (claim (C) from above), we 
allow for the possibility that the core features can be justified by various 
argumentative sources. Perhaps some features are justified by appealing to moral 
blameworthiness (which is a pre-legal notion) whereas some features can only be 
justified by appealing to a legal notion of culpability. Moreover, some features might 
be justified by pragmatic considerations and yet others may be justified by reasons of 
justice that are neither merely pragmatic nor culpability-based (such as the principle 
that convicting an innocent person is much worse than failing to convict a guilty 
person). Furthermore, when we reject claim (C), it is possible to justify a single core 
feature by appealing to different kinds of arguments.  
 To make this more concrete, consider a core feature of the criminal law that ‘one 
should not be punished for bad attitudes, or a willingness to offend unless it’s 
manifested in action’.19 The three claims that make up Sarch’s first methodological 
presumptions yield a theory of culpability according to which one’s degree of 
culpability is not affected by the fact that ‘one would be willing to act in worse ways 
that one actually did’ and hence concerns insufficient regard that is manifested by the 
criminal conduct in question.20 But instead of defending a theory of culpability that 
is restricted to manifested insufficient regard, one could justify the manifestation 
requirement by appealing to the broader (moral or at least pre-legal) notion of 
blameworthiness that concerns insufficient regard simpliciter and then provide legally 
relevant reasons (such as pragmatic and epistemic reasons as well as reasons to do 
with justice and the rule of law) for why the criminal law is not—and should not be—
solely interested in blameworthiness and why manifestation of insufficient regard 
should be required in criminal law. 
 I agree that this alternative picture of the criminal law is messier and so perhaps 
Alex can defend this theory on the grounds of parsimony. However, I worry that 
 
19 Sarch (n 1) 43. 
20 ibid. 
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this—perhaps more parsimonious—theory of culpability rules out other forms of 
argument for the core features of the criminal law. For instance, Sarch claims that 
his theory of culpability with his explication of the manifestation requirement is 
better than an alternative that takes an epistemic approach to manifestation. He 
claims that appealing to pragmatic considerations to explain the manifestation 
requirement is “unsatisfying” because ‘[i]t does not capture the full strength of the 
principles to which criminal law is committed’.21 But for this argument to work, we 
need reasons for favouring an explanation of the various principles or core features 
of the criminal law in terms of culpability. This, I hope, further motivates the need 
for arguments for the first methodological presumption despite its initial plausibility. 
 To further illustrate the substantive implication of claim (C) of the first 
methodological presumption, recall that according to Sarch, the fact that motives are 
generally irrelevant to the criminal law is a core feature of the criminal law. Given his 
methodological presumption, this core feature plays a crucial role in Sarch’s theory 
of posited (and normative) criminal culpability. This is because the fact that motive 
is irrelevant to the criminal law is taken as supporting the claim that motives are 
irrelevant to whether or not a defendant is culpable as well as the claim that motives 
are irrelevant to the degree of the defendant’s culpability. This appears to assume that 
it would be best if general irrelevance of motives to the criminal law could be 
explained solely in terms of culpability, but again, this assumption requires support.  
 Relatedly, one might question why we should want a motive-free notion of 
criminal culpability. Sarch’s rationale appeals to the claim that ‘coarse-grained, 
motive-free description[s] [are] the most suitable way to define the act types to be 
criminalized’.22 But this raises the question of why culpability should track these 
descriptions especially when more fine-grained and motive-laden descriptions might 
be more appropriate in sentencing. Although we may have good reasons why the 
legislature should provide coarse-grained motive-free descriptions when defining 
criminal offences, it is unclear why culpability should track substantive criminal law 
or which act-type counts as a distinct criminal offence. 
 Sarch claims—and I agree—that some factors that are relevant to sentencing 
concern deterrence and rehabilitation and so ‘culpability is not the only relevant 
sentencing factor’.23 Nevertheless, as Sarch notes, not all factors to do with sentencing 
are pragmatic; some, in fact, concern (moral/pre-legal notion of) blameworthiness. 
For example, some aggravating and mitigating factors that affect sentencing—
including motives—are relevant to blameworthiness.24 But in claiming that culpability 
should be motive-free, this puts pressure on Sarch’s reliance on the supposed 
continuity between culpability and blameworthiness to justify his theory of 
culpability. (I examine this issue in detail in §4.) More importantly at this juncture, 
however, whether or not motives are relevant to culpability is a contentious issue. 
This illustrates the substantive commitment that Sarch’s methodological 
presumptions can imply. 
 
21 ibid 42. 
22 ibid 58. 
23 ibid. 
24 Perhaps this explains why Sarch himself used to think motives affected culpability. He indicates that 
he has changed his mind on the relevance of motives to culpability (ibid. 86; footnote 4.). Cf. ‘Willful 
Ignorance, Culpability, and the Criminal Law’ (2014) 88 St. John’s Law Review 1023.  
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 I highlighted two core features of criminal law: (i) the manifestation requirement; 
and (ii) general irrelevance of motives. My worry here is not that these features are 
not core features (notwithstanding my comments concerning whether this general 
irrelevance can be attributed to the criminal law as a whole), but rather the 
unsupported assumption that the best way to defend these features is by proposing a 
particular theory of culpability that can explain and justify these features. I agree that 
making this methodological presumption results in continuity between Sarch’s 
theories of posited culpability and normative culpability. 25  Moreover, given the 
structural similarity between normative culpability and moral blameworthiness, the 
hope is that this methodological presumption yields a defence of the substantive 
wilful ignorance doctrine that is normatively solid. In addition, since the defence of 
this doctrine is based on the idea of equal culpability, a more general theory of mens 
rea imputation can be defended on normatively solid grounds.   
 However, it is unclear to me whether there are sufficient similarities between 
normative culpability and moral blameworthiness such that normative culpability 
can inherit the normatively solid foundation of moral blameworthiness. But before 
I explain these worries in more detail, let us turn to the other methodological 
presumption. 
3. Methodological Presumption 2: Official Rationales 
Recall that Sarch does not only presume that we should start by defending the core 
features of the criminal law (in a given jurisdiction) in terms of a single coherent 
theory of culpability, but that we should start by defending the particular rationales 
for the doctrines that are endorsed by the courts (in that jurisdiction). Relying on 
this second methodological presumption, Sarch justifies omitting discussions of 
consequentialist forms of argument that appeals to the thought that although a 
defendant who is wilfully ignorant is not as culpable as a defendant guilty of a 
knowledge crime, ceteris paribus, criminalising those who are  wilfully ignorant and/or 
and punishing them to the same extent as those who knowingly commit crimes is a 
good way of preventing more knowledge crimes. 26  Furthermore, Sarch bypasses 
another form of argument that appeals to the thought that ‘when one has deliberately 
preserved one’s ignorance of some inculpatory fact, one should be estopped from 
denying that one knew it’.27 
 I agree wholeheartedly that the court’s official justifications should be 
considered seriously. But it is less clear to me why they should be ‘adhered to … as 
our stating point’.28 This worry is compounded by the fact that there is no single US 
federal criminal court that speaks with one voice and makes judgements consistently 
and uniformly. This means that what is regarded as the official justification itself is 
 
25 Recall that posited culpability concerns insufficient regard, manifested by a criminal action, for 
interests, values, and reasons that are recognised by the criminal law (in a given jurisdiction) whereas 
normative culpability concerns insufficient regard, manifested by a criminal action, for interests, 
values, and reasons that should be recognised by the criminal law (in a given jurisdiction). 
26 As Sarch mentions Paul Robinson who discusses a justification of this kind for imputing a different 
mens rea and criminalizing (and punishing) a mens rea not had by the defendant. See Paul Robinson, 
‘Imputed Criminal Liability’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 609. 
27 Sarch (n 1) 16. Sarch attributes this argument to David Enoch. 
28 ibid. 
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doubly contingent: it is not simply a matter of what particular judges decide in 
particular cases (and what gets included in the majority opinion), but which 
judgements and phrases get taken up by particular judges at a later point.29 
 Put another way, this methodological presumption raises a burden of proof issue. 
Given the careful and sophisticated arguments provided by Sarch in defence of the 
court’s official justification for the substantive wilful ignorance doctrine, a heavier 
burden must now be shouldered by those who want to defend alternative 
justifications. Here, I am not attributing to Sarch the claim that those who prefer 
alternative justifications shoulder a heavier burden of proof (or even that Sarch is 
attempting to benefit from distributing a heavier burden of proof on those who 
prefer alternative justifications). But I take it that given that Sarch has provided 
arguments for the court’s official rationales for the substantive wilful ignorance 
doctrine, those who prefer alternative justifications cannot now merely show that the 
substantive wilful ignorance doctrine can be justified on deterrence grounds, say, but 
that they need to examine the relative merits of these different arguments and show 
why we need to appeal to deterrence grounds to justify the substantive wilful 
ignorance doctrine. But it seems that this differential distribution of burden of proof 
is only justified if the methodological presumptions can be justified.  
 I think there are interesting challenges to both of Sarch’s methodological 
presumptions. I hope to have suggested some reasons for being sceptical of these 
presumptions, especially in light of the fact that these presumptions can have 
substantive implications. 
4. Continuity between Culpability and Blameworthiness 
As I mentioned, Sarch appeals to the continuity between these notions—posited 
culpability, normative culpability, and moral blameworthiness—to do important 
justificatory work for him. The structural analogy between these notions mean that 
culpability-based arguments for the substantive wilful ignorance doctrine as well as 
the general theory of mens rea reputation is on a ‘normatively solid foundation’. 
Moreover, given the dominance of ‘quality of will’ theories of moral blameworthiness, 
a theory of culpability that concerns insufficient regard can be seen as particularly 
attractive. But here, I raise some challenges for thinking that culpability can inherit 
a ‘normatively solid foundation’ from blameworthiness by noting some important 
differences between culpability and blameworthiness. 
 The first issue concerns the role that manifestation plays in culpability and 
blameworthiness. I agree with Sarch that manifestation is important to the criminal 
law. We have seen that Sarch takes the manifestation requirement to be a necessary 
condition on culpability itself. Sarch maintains some similarity between culpability 
and blameworthiness by claiming that according to a quality of will theory, ‘an act is 
morally blameworthy to the extent it manifests insufficient regard for the moral 
reasons bearing on whether to do that act’.30 However, it is not clear whether the kind 
 
29 Indeed, Sarch mentions conflicting decisions regarding wilful ignorance doctrine itself. For example, 
he claims that the First and Fourth circuits issue conflicting decisions on whether wilful ignorance in 
the basic sense suffices. ibid. 23. 
30 Sarch (n 1) 64. In support of this analysis of the quality of will theory of blameworthiness, he cites 
Julia Markovits ‘Acting for the Right Reasons’ (2010) 119 The Philosophical Review 201. He also cites, 
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of manifestation that is plausibly required in the criminal law is also plausibly 
required for blameworthiness. This is due to the fact that Sarch’s account of the 
manifestation requirement appeals to his version of the lenity principle in 
determining how much insufficient regard is manifested in an action. He claims that 
‘D’s action, A, only manifests the least amount of insufficient regard for legally 
protected interests or values … that is needed to explain why a rational and otherwise 
well-motivated person would do A … in the circumstances a D believed them to be.’31 
Moreover, he claims that the ‘motivation for this principle is that the state, given its 
superior power, should resolve any ambiguity in its punishment practices in favour 
of accused citizens.’32 But if manifestation is a metaphysically robust notion such that 
it plays an important role in moral blameworthiness, it is unclear why how much 
insufficient regard is manifested in an action should be subject to any principle of 
lenity. If there is a fact of the matter about how much insufficient regard is manifested 
by an action and this is a moral or at least non-legal matter, then the amount of 
insufficient regard manifested should not be affected by the fact that the inquiry is a 
legal one involving the state with its superior power.  
If, on the other hand, manifestation is not a metaphysically or morally robust 
notion, or there is no fact of the matter about how much insufficient regard is 
manifested, then invoking a principle of lenity makes sense in the context of the 
criminal law. As Sarch claims, there are design constraints, epistemic limitations and 
other institutional reasons such as the need for laws to be ‘simple and stable enough 
to serve as a publically available guide to action.’33 Given this, one could argue that 
the amount of insufficient regard that counts as being manifested is calculated by 
determining the smallest possible departure from the amount of regard of a law-
abiding counterpart. However, Sarch claims that his principle of lenity and therefore 
the resulting account of manifestation is ‘nonepistemic’ and contrast his account 
with an epistemic approach: 
An action A manifests a level of insufficient regard n if and only if 
(and because) a rational, unbiased observer would infer from the 
relevant evidence that the defendant who did A possessed a level of 
insufficient regard equal to n when doing A.34 
He challenges this epistemic approach to manifestation on the basis that when there 
is no ambiguity, the epistemic approaches lead to incorrect verdicts about the degree 
of culpability that is manifested. However, it is unclear whether this criticism is well-
founded given that, on this version, there is no fact of the matter about how much 
insufficient regard is manifested. Moreover, given that the motivation of Sarch’s own 
principle of lenity concerns the superior power of the state and resolving ambiguities 
in favour of defendants, it is unclear the extent to which his principle is nonepistemic.  
 In sum, it is unclear whether the kind of manifestation that plays a role in the 
criminal law (and so in determining culpability for Sarch) also plays a role in 
 
in—accompanying footnote (64: footnote 101)— Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder In Praise of Desire 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 170. 
31 Sarch (n 1) 51. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 65. 
34 Ibid. 40. 
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determining moral blameworthiness. I agree that there are legal design constraints 
that should affect the severity of defendant’s punishment. But since these design 
constraints do not determine the degree of moral blameworthiness, we need an 
argument for thinking that these design constraints affect the degree of culpability 
rather than claiming that there are design constraints that affect the severity of 
punishment (so that the state does not always punish in accordance with the degree 
of culpability). Moreover, given that these design constraints are not relevant to moral 
blameworthiness, but are relevant to culpability—at least, on the theory defended by 
Sarch—it is unclear on what basis culpability can inherit a ‘normatively solid 
foundation’ from blameworthiness. 
 The second, related, issue concerns Sarch’s claim that culpability is a legal notion 
and that because of the aforementioned legal design constraints, ‘the landscape of 
legally recognized reasons that determine criminal culpability properly will be more 
anemic than the richer landscape of moral reasons that affect blameworthiness’.35 
The question here is whether we can square this with the claim that ‘despite 
distinguishing normative culpability (a legal notion) from moral blameworthiness, 
the insufficient regard theory reveals deep continuities between these two notions’.36 
Perhaps there is a ‘structural’ analogy between these two notions if culpability 
concerns insufficient regard for legal reasons and moral blameworthiness concerns 
insufficient regard for moral reasons. But it is unclear how significant this structural 
similarity is such that latter can justify the former and thereby justifying the 
substantive wilful ignorance doctrine as well as the more general equal culpability 
imputation. After all, there are substantive differences between culpability and moral 
blameworthiness, such as the (ir)relevance of motives, the applicability of the 
principle of lenity as well as the kind of manifestation that is required.  
 Finally, there appears to be a difference between legally recognised and protected 
interests and values and legal reasons that concern design constraints and epistemic 
and pragmatic considerations. Suppose that there should not be a crime of adultery. 
This means that being free from being cheated on by your partner is not a legally 
protected interest. But this claim seems different from the thought that convicting 
an innocent person is much worse than failing to convict a guilty person or the 
principle that we should account for the superior power of the state (over the 
individual defendant). Given that the latter kind of legal reasons are invoked in 
determining culpability (which is exemplified by Sarch’s appeal to the lenity 
principle), but do not seem relevant at all to moral blameworthiness, the mere 
structural analogy cannot provide a more solid normative foundation.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
I end by making a general point about how to adjudicate between different kinds of 
arguments for some feature of the criminal law. In particular, examining some of the 
methodological presumptions employed by Sarch leads to question whether it is 
better for some feature of criminal law to be explained by a theory of culpability or 
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36 Ibid. 266. 
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whether that feature is best addressed as an epistemic or pragmatic consideration 
about the public institution that is the criminal law.  
 Sarch prefers the former and defends a sophisticated theory of normative 
culpability that is a distinctly legal notion that bears a structural similarity with moral 
blameworthiness. The explanatory burden of various core features of the criminal 
law, on Sarch’s picture, is shouldered by this legal notion of culpability. But if one 
aim is to inherit the normatively solid foundation of moral blameworthiness, there 
may be a better alternative: core features of the criminal law reflect the concern for 
moral blameworthiness, but there are legal design constraints that justify departing 
from doctrines that always perfect match claims about the defendant’s moral 
blameworthiness. On this picture, we do not have to posit a single coherent theory 
of culpability that can explain and justify all of the core features of the criminal law. 
Rather, we provide various reasons—some to do with the severity of crime, some to 
do with moral blameworthiness of the defendant for committing the crime, some to 
do with pragmatic or epistemic considerations, and some to do with demands of 
justice. On this picture, the kinds of arguments for the wilful ignorance doctrine, 
omitted by Sarch on the basis of the second methodological presumption, would 
need to be explored.  
 I agree that Sarch’s sophisticated theory of culpability can provide a 
parsimonious explanation of (the core features of) the criminal law. But I wonder if 
the virtue of parsimony outweighs the value of arguments that address—at least, more 
directly—criminal law as a political institution. I would like to conclude by thanking 
Alex for the opportunity for me to indulge in these methodological musings and I 
look forward to many fruitful discussions about how to theorise about the law. 
